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Abstract
We study an agency model with moral hazard, when the employer o®ers com-
plementary training/development programs that will increase the productivity of the
employee's e®ort. Since it is costly for an employer to o®er training and development
opportunities and given that employees are not identical, how will an employer choose
the quantity and allocation of such programs? Does the quantity and type of training
o®ered, vary with the employee's aversion to e®ort? Does more \sincerity" necessarily
translate into more employee development? Does more training in fact induce the em-
ployee to work harder? In theory the answer could go either way. On the one hand, an
employer may wish to leverage the use of such programs to motivate a lazy employee
to work harder. Conversely, especially because e®ort is unobservable, one can argue
that she may be better o® rewarding a sincere employee with more development op-
portunities. This work reaches a de¯nite and perhaps unpredictable conclusion. We
¯nd that there is an inverse relationship between the optimal quantity of the training
program and increased aversion to e®ort for both a relatively lazy and a relatively
sincere employee. This is also true regardless of whether the program is relatively
cheap or relatively expensive for the employer to o®er. Perhaps surprisingly, there is
no qualitative change in the comparative statics results, if the employer can monitor
or observe e®ort.
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11 Introduction
Worker training programs to increase productivity are common in the workplace. Employers
often provide a variety of training programs such as seminars, workshops and technical
skill development opportunities. There is a rich literature on di®erent types of training
programs and their e®ects on worker productivity. Beginning with Becker (1962), various
researchers have examined the e®ectiveness of investment in human capital to improve worker
productivity. More recently, Bartel (1994) ¯nds that there is a robust relationship between
training and worker productivity. Barrett and O'Connell (2001) estimate the returns to
in-company training and distinguish between general and speci¯c training. They ¯nd higher
productivity gains from general training and one of their interpretations of this ¯nding is
that it is a signal to the employee of his value, and this leads the employee to exert more
e®ort and raise productivity.
This article studies a principal agent model with moral hazard, when the employer (prin-
cipal) o®ers a piece rate contact to the employee (agent) and also o®ers complementary
training programs that will increase the productivity of the employee's e®ort. Since the
employee derives disutility from e®ort, the training program provides the employer an in-
strument to decrease the uncertainty in the employee's contract and hence in his income.
This potentially motivates the employee to exert more e®ort, which, all else equal, translates
into higher expected output.
The use of piece rate contracts is ubiquitous in many industries. Lazear (2000) studies
the e®ect of piece rate pay and ¯nds substantially improved performance (relative to ¯xed
wage contracts) among workers who installed windshields. Nagin et al (2002) ¯nd that piece
rate pay is very e®ective in call centers but requires careful measurement of output. Shearer
(2004) uses data from a ¯eld experiment in a tree planting company to estimate gains in
productivity that are realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than ¯xed wages. He
estimates productivity gains in the order of approximately 20%. Other examples of industries
where piece rate contracts are fairly common are agricultural sharecropping and real estate.
Dunlop and Weil (1996) in a study of the apparel industry, ¯nd that manufacturers frequently
pay by the piece to complete speci¯c parts of garments.
Within this theoretical framework, this work asks the following question: Given that it
is costly for an employer to o®er training and development opportunities to an employee
and given that employees are not identical, how will an employer choose the quantity and
allocation of such programs? The di®erence between the employees is their attitude or aver-
sion to e®ort. The employer does not observe employee e®ort but knows the employee's
preferences and most particularly his aversion to e®ort. Therefore, what is the relationship
between the employee \type" (given by the employee's aversion to e®ort) and the training
and development opportunity o®ered by the employer? This is a key focus of our work. Does
the level and type of training o®ered, vary with the employee's aversion to e®ort? Does
more \sincerity" or less aversion to e®ort, necessarily translate into more (or perhaps more
expensive) training opportunities? Does more training in fact induce the employee to work
harder?
The answers to these questions are not necessarily obvious. As employers have, over time,
2included a variety of human resource management practices such as employee training and
development, they are forced to make choices about how to allocate these additional resources
for the highest yield. When an employer cannot observe e®ort, she may be able to leverage the
training and development opportunity to motivate a relatively lazy employee to work harder.
This argument might be true since more training increases the productivity of the employee's
e®ort and raises expected output. So it is possible that when e®ort is unobservable to the
employer, the lazy employee receives more of the development opportunities. Conversely
however, one can argue that especially when the employer cannot observe e®ort, she must
motivate a sincere employee with further development opportunities. Since the moral hazard
problem is less severe for a sincere employee, an investment in raising his productivity is more
likely to generate higher output. In theory therefore, the answer could go either way. This
work reaches a de¯nite and perhaps unpredictable conclusion.
Our model, which we shall discuss in the next section, captures the essentials of this
problem. We wish to emphasize that in spite of the apparent simplicity of the model, the
comparative statics are by no means trivial to derive. These arguments will be developed in
the paper with details given in a technical Appendix. 1
As a benchmark, we ¯rst study the complete information case when the employee's e®ort
is observable by the employer. The main results in the complete information case are as
follows.
C1. The employer sets the wage directly as a function of the observable e®ort, and as
expected there is a positive relationship between wage and e®ort.
C2. The greater the employee's aversion to e®ort, the fewer the training programs pro-
vided by the employer. This is true for both a cheap and an expensive program. It is also
true for both a relatively lazy and a relatively sincere employee.
The results for the complete information case are used as a benchmark for the results
with incomplete information, which are summarized below.
IC1. The employee's optimal e®ort is positively related to more training by the employer.
That is, more training induces the employee to exert more e®ort. This translates into higher
expected output and hence higher expected wage compensation.
IC2. There is an inverse relationship between the optimal quantity of the training pro-
gram and increased aversion to e®ort for both a relatively lazy and a relatively sincere
employee. That is, an increased aversion to e®ort will induce the employer to o®er less train-
ing, regardless of whether the employee is intrinsically more or less averse to e®ort. This is
also true regardless of whether the program is relatively cheap or relatively expensive for the
employer to o®er.
The article is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2 and the com-
plete information version is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the analysis of the
optimal contract with incomplete information. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are
presented in the Appendix in Section 6.
1One may think about alternative speci¯cations of the wage contract. Bose et al 2009 (forthcoming)
have compared the optimality of linear contracts vis a vis the second best contract. That work also yields
signi¯cant insight into the technical complexities involved in the solution of these models.
32 Model
This model is primarily based on Holmstrom (1979). 2 Consider a ¯rm owned by a risk
neutral principal (employer) and operated by a risk averse agent (employee). The employer
observes only the output x 2 [0;1), produced by the employee but cannot observe the
employee's e®ort, a 2 A. The employer o®ers the employee a piece rate contract which
consists of a share µ, of the output, and a training/development program p, that increases
the employee's marginal productivity of e®ort. The employer also knows the employee's
aversion with respect to e®ort, ±.
Given e®ort level a, let x 2 [0;1) follow the density
f (xja) = f(x;p;a) =
1
ap¡(p)
x
p¡1e
¡x=a; for x 2 [0;1) (2.1)
It is easily seen that the expected value of output E(x), equals ap. That is, a higher p will
increase the expected output. The Gamma function, ¡(¢), is de¯ned as
¡(p) =
Z 1
0
e
¡xx
p¡1dx for p > 0: (2.2)
The use of the gamma density to capture the stochastic relationship between the employee's
unobserved e®ort and his observed output o®ers some advantages. The density is quite
°exible, and so permits an analysis of a substantial variety of relationships between e®ort and
output. With suitable values of p and a, f(xja) o®ers close approximations to many unimodal
densities. The use of the gamma density also facilitates the identi¯cation of conditions under
which the tractable ¯rst-order approach can be employed to solve the employer's problem
e.g., Rogerson (1985), Jewitt (1988). Holmstrom (1979) uses an exponential density which
is a special case of the gamma density for p = 1. Generalization with respect to p allows
us to study the relationship between p (training development program) and ± (aversion to
e®ort).
The employee's expected utility function is given by
U
A(a) =
Z 1
0
2
p
µxf(xja)dx ¡ a
±; ± > 0:
We use the term, employee \type" to refer to the employee's aversion to e®ort de¯ned by
the parameter ±. Hence a higher (lower) ± is indicative of a higher aversion to e®ort if a > 1
(a < 1) and so de¯nes a lazy employee.
The employer incurs a cost to provide the training program and this is given by
p®
k0 where
® > 1 and k0 > 0. Here p denotes the level of the program and k0 denotes the cost such that
a higher (lower) k0 will decrease (increase) the cost. While this function is not completely
general, it allows for a wide class of strictly convex cost functions. We normalize the cost
2Marino and Zabojnik (2008) use the linear contract principal agent framework in Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) to study the role of perks that have productive consumption attributes . The focus of their work is
perks that can be used for purely personal use.
4by de¯ning k0 = ®k and rewrite this cost as
p®
®k
for analytical convenience. Since ® is ¯xed,
any change in k is equivalent to a change in k0.
The employer's pro¯t is hence given by
L(a;p) =
Z 1
0
(1 ¡ µ)xf(xja)dx ¡
p®
®k
:
where (1 ¡ µ) is her share of output x.
3 Complete Information
The model described in the previous section is necessarily for the incomplete information
case. When the employer can observe e®ort, this is modi¯ed as follows. She pays the
employee a wage w. Hence the employee's utility function is now
2
p
w ¡ a
± where ± > 0:
The employer sets the wage for the employee such that,
Z 1
0
2
p
wf (xja)dx ¡ a
± = 0
which implies
w
¤ =
a2±
4
:
We note that, as expected, employee wage is positively related to observed e®ort.
For a given output x, the employer's share of output is x ¡ w¤ and hence her payo® is
given by
¼ =
Z 1
0
[x ¡ w
¤]f (xja)dx ¡
p®
®k
=
Z 1
0
xf (xja)dx ¡ w
¤ ¡
p®
®k
= ap ¡ w
¤ ¡
p®
®k
= ap ¡
a2±
4
¡
p®
®k
:
The employer will choose the employee's e®ort level a and program level p to maximize this
payo® ¼.
Lemma 1 below, states the pro¯t maximizing values of p and a. See Subsection 6.1 of
Appendix for a proof. The global maximum of ¼ with respect to p and a will be denoted by
¼¤. The values of p and a at which this global maximum is attained will be denoted by p¤
and a¤.
5Lemma 1 Suppose ± > 1=2.
(i) If ® > 1 +
1
2± ¡ 1
=
2±
2± ¡ 1
then
p
¤ =
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±(®¡1)¡®
k
2±¡1
2±(®¡1)¡® and a
¤ =
·
k
1
®¡1
µ
2
±
¶¸ (®¡1)
2±(®¡1)¡®
: (3.1)
and
¼
¤ =
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1
(p
¤)
2±
2±¡1
·
1 ¡
1
2±
¡
1
®
¸
:
Further, a¤ ¸ 1, if and only if ± · 2k
1
®¡1.
(ii) If ® < 1 + 1
2±¡1 then there is no interior optimum of ¼ and the maximum value of ¼ is
1 and is obtained if we let a±¡1 =
2p
± ! 1.
(iii) Suppose ® = 1 + 1
2±¡1 then
(a) if
¡
2
±
¢ 1
2±¡1 > 1
k the maximum value of ¼ is 1 and is obtained if we let a2±¡1 =
2p
± ! 1.
(b) if
¡
2
±
¢ 1
2±¡1 · 1
k the maximum value of ¼ is 0 and is obtained at a¤ = p¤ = 0.
In view of Lemma 1, we will henceforth always impose the restriction ® > 1+ 1
2±¡1.
This ensures that the employer's cost of providing the training program is su±ciently convex.
In examining the optimal contract, the ¯rst question of interest is the relationship between
the employee e®ort a, and his aversion to e®ort. Lemma 2 below derives the the behavior of
@a¤
@±
. Its proof is given in Section 6.2. The relationship between a¤ and ± is summarized in
Proposition 1.
Lemma 2 Assume that ± > 1=2 and ® > 1 + 1
2±¡1.
(i) If k <
µ
±
2e
¶®¡1
then
@a¤
@±
> 0.
(ii) If k > max
(
2e
±
;
µ
±
2
¶®¡1
;e
®¡1
®
)
then
@a¤
@±
< 0.
Note that from Lemma 1 (i), if 2ek
1
®¡1 < ±, then a¤ · 1. That is, a higher ± indicates less
aversion to e®ort. Likewise, if 2k
1
®¡1 > ±, then a¤ ¸ 1. In other words, in this case, a higher
± indicates more aversion to e®ort. As an illustration of the Lemma, suppose ® = 2. Then
we need ± > 1 and @a¤
@± > 0 if 2ek < ± and @a¤
@± < 0 if 2e=k < ± < 2k. Figure 1 explains the
result of this Lemma when ® = 4. In general, the conditions in the above Lemma on the
relative values of k and ±, that determine the signs of the derivatives, are su±cient but are
not exhaustive. One may garner more precise (but cumbersome) conditions by following the
proof of the Lemma. The above Lemma 1 and 2 lead to the following Proposition.
6Proposition 1 (i) With complete information, the employer sets wage as a function of the
observable e®ort and there is a positive relationship between w¤ and a.
(ii) If ± is su±ciently small (large), relative to k, the relationship between e®ort, a¤, and
increasing aversion to e®ort, ±, is negative.
When the employer observes e®ort, Proposition 1 ¯nds that there is an inverse relationship
between e®ort and increasing aversion to e®ort regardless of whether the training program
is su±ciently cheap or expensive. As we will see from Proposition 2, this choice of e®ort by
the employee is consistent with the employer's response in terms of programs o®ered, under
similar relative parameter conditions.
Lemma 3 establishes the relationship between p¤ and ± and it is qualitatively summarized
in Proposition 2. The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Section 6.3.
Lemma 3 Suppose ® > 1 + 1
2±¡1.
(i) If k >
µ
±
2
¶®¡1
, then
@p¤
@±
< 0.
(ii) If k < e
®
2±
µ
±
2e
¶®¡1
, then
@p¤
@±
> 0.
A su±cient condition for (ii) is k <
µ
±
2e
¶®¡1
. Again, suppose ® = 2. Then we need ± > 1.
It then follows that
@p¤
@± < 0 if ± < 2k and
@p¤
@± > 0 if ± > 2ek. Figures 2 and 3 explain the
result of this Lemma when ® = 1:5 and ® = 4 respectively.
Proposition 2 If k is su±ciently large (small) compared to ±, then there is an inverse
(direct) relationship between p¤ and ±.
If the employer's cost of providing the program is su±ciently small (k large relative to ±)
then a¤ > 1. Hence as ± increases, the employee's aversion to e®ort increases and the em-
ployer provides fewer development programs. In the same way, if the program is su±ciently
expensive (k small relative to ±) then a¤ < 1. Hence as ± decreases, the employee's aversion
to e®ort increases and the employer provides fewer programs. Combining Propositions 1
and 2 we conclude that when e®ort is observable, the employer always rewards decreasing
aversion to e®ort with more training and development programs.
4 Incomplete Information
In this case, the employer can only observe output and not the employee's e®ort. She chooses
µ (the employee's share of output) and p (program) to maximize her payo®. Under the piece
rate contract, the employee chooses e®ort a to maximize, with respect to a, his expected
7utility, UA, given by
U
A (a) = 2
p
µ
Z 1
0
x
1
2 1
ap¡(p)
x
p¡1e
¡x=adx ¡ a
± (4.1)
= 2
p
µ
³
a
1
2
´ ¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
¡ a
±:
Then the employer will choose µ and p to maximize her expected payo®.
Parts of the following result on optimal e®ort ^ a (given p) and the employee's optimal
share of output µ¤ is also available in Bose, Pal and Sappington (2009).
Lemma 4 (i) UA is maximized at
b a =
"p
µ
±
Ã
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
!# 2
2±¡1
: (4.2)
(ii) The agent's participation constraint is satis¯ed at b a. That is, UA(b a) > 0.
(iii) The employee's optimal e®ort ^ a is positively related to p.
(iv) The employer's expected payo® is maximized at µ
¤ =
1
2±
.
See Subsection 6.5 of Appendix for a proof of Lemma 4.
Henceforth, whenever µ appears in an expression, it is understood that it stands for the
above optimum value 1
2±.
We now focus on optimizing L (employer's pro¯t when employee gives e®ort ^ a) with
respect to p. Recall
L =
Z 1
0
[(1 ¡ µ)x]f (xjb a)dx ¡
p®
®k
(4.3)
= (1 ¡ µ)b ap ¡
p®
®k
: (4.4)
De¯ne
H(p) = log¡(p +
1
2
) ¡ log¡(p):
With the above notation, we get
@L
@p
= (1 ¡ µ)b a + (1 ¡ µ)pb a
2
2± ¡ 1
H
0
(p) ¡
p®¡1
k
:
Hence, the ¯rst order condition for maximizing L with respect to p is given by
p®¡1
k
= (1 ¡ µ)b a[1 +
2p
2± ¡ 1
H
0
(p)]: (4.5)
8Using µ = 1
2±, this may also be written in the alternative forms
p®¡1
k
= (1 ¡ µ)b a[1 +
2p
2± ¡ 1
H
0
(p)] (4.6)
=
1
2±
[2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0
(p)]b a (4.7)
=
1
2
2
2±¡1
[2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p)]
·
¡(p + 1
2)
¡p
¸ 2
2±¡1
±
¡
2(±+1)
2±¡1 : (4.8)
Lemma 5 proves the existence of a unique interior optimum value of p¤ which maximizes L.
See Subsection 6.6 for proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 If ® > 1 + 8±
4±2¡1, then L attains a unique maximum at a ¯nite p = p¤ and
L(p¤) > 0.
Remark 1 As we shall see in the proof of Lemma 5, when ® < 1 + 1
2±(2±¡1), L attains a
global minimum at a ¯nite p and its global maximum is attained only at p = 1. Thus this
case is uninteresting and out of our consideration.
To investigate what happens to the optimum solution p¤ as ± varies, using (4.8) (and writing
p for p¤ to ease notation),
(® ¡ 1)logp ¡ logk = ¡
2±
2± ¡ 1
log2 ¡
2(± + 1)
2± ¡ 1
log± +
2
2± ¡ 1
H(p)
+log(2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p))
= [¡
2± ¡ 1
2± ¡ 1
log2 ¡
log2
2± ¡ 1
] + [¡
2± ¡ 1
2± ¡ 1
log2 ¡
3
2± ¡ 1
log±]
+
2
2± ¡ 1
H(p) + log(2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p))
= ¡log2 ¡
log2
2± ¡ 1
¡ log± ¡
3
2± ¡ 1
log±
+
2
(2± ¡ 1)
H(p) + log(2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p)):
Di®erentiating the above ¯rst order equation @L
@p = 0 with respect to ±,
(® ¡ 1)
p
@p
@±
=
2log2
(2± ¡ 1)2 ¡
1
±
¡
3
(2± ¡ 1)±
+
6
(2± ¡ 1)2 log±
¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p) +
2
(2± ¡ 1)
H
0(p)
@p
@±
+
1
2± ¡ 1 + 2pH0(p)
[2 + 2(H
0(p) + pH
00(p))
@p
@±
which may be written as
C1
@p
@±
= C2; say;
9where
C1 =
®(2± ¡ 1) ¡ (2± ¡ 1 + 2pH0(p))
p(2± ¡ 1)
¡
2(H0(p) + pH00(p))
2± ¡ 1 + 2pH0(p)
; (4.9)
C2 = [
2log2
(2± ¡ 1)2 ¡
1
±
¡
3
±(2± ¡ 1)
+
6
(2± ¡ 1)2 log±] (4.10)
+[¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p) +
2
2± ¡ 1 + 2pH0(p)
]: (4.11)
Lemma 6 and 7 provide conditions that determine the signs of C1 and C2. That in turn
determines the direction of the relationship between the employee type and the program
o®ered in the optimal contract. The proofs are given in Subsection 6.7 and 6.8 in the
Appendix. Since we are dealing with highly nonlinear equations and with implicit solutions,
it is inevitable that the parameter conditions for the sign of the derivative turns out to be
messy. The proof of 7 is technically the most di±cult among all the arguments of this paper.
Lemma 6 If ® > 1 + 10±¡1
2±(2±¡1), then C1 > 0.
Lemma 7 Suppose ± > 1=2 and ® > 1 + 8±
4±2¡1.
(i) If k ¸
(2±)
3
2±¡1
¼
1
2±¡1
then p¤ ¸ 1, a¤ ¸ 1 and C2 < 0.
(ii) If k ·
2±
2± + 1
min
(
(2±)
3
2±¡1
(¼e4)
1
2±¡1
;
(2±)3(®¡1)
(¼e4)(®¡1)
)
then p¤ · 1, a¤ · 1 and C2 > 0.
It may be noted that 3
2±¡1 > 3(® ¡ 1). Hence if ± ¸ 1, then (2±)
3
2±¡1 > (2±)3(®¡1). On the
other hand (¼e4)
1
2±¡1 < (¼e4)(®¡1). Hence if ± > 1, then a su±cient condition for (ii) to hold
is k < 2±
2±+1
(2±)
3
2±¡1
(¼e4)(®¡1). Figures 4 and 5 explain the result for this Lemma when ® = 1:2 and
® = 2:1 respectively. Clearly, there is subset of the parameter space where the above Lemma
does not identify the sign of C2. This is due to the fact that p¤ is determined only as the
solution involving transcendental functions and the derivative of p¤ involves the digamma
function and its derivative.
Using the above results, we now have the relationships between employee type ±, the
optimal program p and the employer's cost of providing the program. These are summarized
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 There is an inverse relationship between the optimal quantity of program
and increasing aversion to e®ort for both a relatively lazy and a relatively sincere employee.
This holds regardless of whether the program is relatively cheap or expensive.
We see that as the employee exhibits an increasing aversion to e®ort, (that is, as ± increases
for a¤ ¸ 1 and decreases for a¤ · 1), the employer uses less of the instrument that she controls
directly (the quantity of the development program, p). This is because while she cannot
10observe actual e®ort, she knows and uses her information about an employee's aversion
toward e®ort. Consequently, she punishes increasing aversion to e®ort with fewer programs.
Lemma 7 also proves that when the program is relatively cheap (k is relatively large) then
the employer will provide more of it (p¤ ¸ 1) in an optimal contract, while choosing to
provide less when it is relatively expensive (if k is relatively small then p¤ · 1). While this
latter result by itself may not be especially surprising, what is interesting is that this is true
regardless of the employee's aversion to e®ort.
5 Conclusion
Economists have analyzed a variety of optimal incentive contracts that are aimed at eliciting
optimal e®ort from employees under di®erent work conditions. At the same time, managers
have introduced a variety of human resource management practices to motivate and train
employees. In a moral hazard framework, this work studies how an employer will choose the
quantity and allocation of training and development programs when employees have di®erent
aversion to e®ort. While the empirical literature on such programs is quite unequivocal about
its bene¯ts, the theoretical relationship with employee attitudes to e®ort has not been studied
in any systematic way. One of the challenges was to derive consistent conditions between
and across the fairly large number of parameters and the endogenous variables in the model.
To the extent feasible, we provide a complete and consistent framework to demonstrate this
relationship. We discuss a complete and an incomplete information framework and show
that the unobservability of e®ort does not change the comparative statics analysis in any
qualitative way. One may think of extending the model in di®erent directions. The rather
more obvious ones include di®erent formulations of the wage contract, which we believe will
become extremely complex. What may be a potentially interesting testable hypothesis is
whether and to what extent intrinsic employee aversion to e®ort might be in°uenced by
training programs.
6 Appendix
6.1 Arguments for Lemma 1
For ¯xed p, the maximum value of ¼ with respect to a will be denoted by ¼¤(p) and the
value of a at which this is attained will be denoted by ^ a.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fixing p, and taking derivatives with respect to a,
@¼
@a
= p ¡
2±
4
a
2±¡1; (6.1)
@2¼
@a2 = ¡
2±(2± ¡ 1)
4
a
2±¡2 < 0:
11Hence using (6.1) for ¯xed p, the global maximum of ¼ with respect to a (when a is unre-
stricted) is obtained at
a
2±¡1 =
2p
±
(6.2)
and the corresponding value of ¼ equals
¼
¤(p) = p
µ
2p
±
¶ 1
2±¡1
¡
1
4
µ
2p
±
¶ 2±
2±¡1
¡
p®
®k
(6.3)
= p
2±
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 ·
1 ¡
1
2±
¸
¡
p®
®k
: (6.4)
Now we maximize with respect to p. Taking ¯rst derivative,
@¼¤(p)
@p
=
2±
2± ¡ 1
p
1
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 ·
1 ¡
1
2±
¸
¡
p®¡1
k
(6.5)
= p
1
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1
¡
p®¡1
k
: (6.6)
Solving for
@¼¤(p)
@p = 0 yields p¤ as given in (3.1). Note that as p ! 0, we have ¼¤(p) ! 0.
Further, since ® > 2±
2±¡1, as p ! 1 we have ¼¤(p) ! ¡1. Thus p¤ indeed gives the global
maximum of ¼¤(p). Now a¤ can be obtained by going back to (6.2). The maximum value
¼¤, using (6.6) is obtained as
¼
¤ = (p
¤)
2±
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 ·
1 ¡
1
2±
¸
¡
(p¤)
®
®k
= (p
¤)
2±
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 ·
1 ¡
1
2±
¸
¡
p¤ (p¤)
1
2±¡1
®k
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1
= (p
¤)
2±
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 ·
1 ¡
1
2±
¡
1
®
¸
:
This proves (i).
(ii) To prove (ii), recall (6.4). If ® < 2±
2±¡1, then it is easy to see that as p ! 1, we have
¼¤(p) ! 1 and (ii) follows immediately.
(iii) To prove (iii), observe that when ® = 2±
2±¡1, using (6.4),
¼
¤(p) = p
2±
2±¡1
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 ·
1 ¡
1
2±
¸
¡
p®
®k
= p
®
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1 1
®
¡
p®
®k
=
p®
®
"µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±¡1
¡
1
k
#
12and then the two claims in (a) and (b) follows easily. ¥
6.2 Arguments for Lemma 2
Let
f1(±) = 1 + 2± [log± ¡ 1 ¡ log2]: (6.7)
f2(±) = 2± [log± ¡ log2 + logk ¡ 1]: (6.8)
The behavior of these two functions, given below in Lemma 8, will be needed in the proof
of Lemma 2.
Lemma 8 (i) For ± > 2, there is a unique ±0, 4:9 < ±0 < 4:95 such that f1(±0) = 0,
f1(±) < 0 for ± < ±0 and f1(±) > 0 for ±0 < ±.
(ii) f2(±) > 0 if and only if ± > 2e
k .
Proof of Lemma 8. (i) It is easy to check that
f
0
1(±) = 2[log± ¡ 1 ¡ log2] +
2±
±
= 2(log± ¡ log2) > 0:
Thus f1(¢) is increasing. It is easily checked that
f1(4:9) = 1 + 9:75(1:58923 ¡ 1 ¡ 0:69314) = ¡0:013 < 0
f1(4:95) = 1 + 9:90(1:59939 ¡ 1 ¡ 0:69314) = 0:07 > 0:
This proves (i).
(ii) This part is trivial once it is observed that log± ¡ log2 + logk ¡ 1 = log
¡
k±
2e
¢
: ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Let ® > 1 + 1
2±¡1. Using the value of a¤ given in (3.1), and taking
logarithm, we get,
loga
¤ =
1
2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®
logk +
® ¡ 1
2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®
[log2 ¡ log±]:
To see if this is increasing or decreasing in ±, taking derivative,
@ loga¤
@±
=
¡2(® ¡ 1)logk
[2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®]2 +
¡2(® ¡ 1)2[log2 ¡ log±]
[2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®]2 +
® ¡ 1
2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®
(¡
1
±
) (6.9)
=
® ¡ 1
±[2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®]2[¡2± logk ¡ 2±(® ¡ 1)(log2 ¡ log±) ¡ 2±(® ¡ 1) + ®] (6.10)
=
® ¡ 1
±[2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®]2 [2±f¡logk ¡ (® ¡ 1)(log2 ¡ log±) ¡ (® ¡ 1)g + ®] (6.11)
=
® ¡ 1
± [2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®]
2
£
2±flog±
®¡1 ¡ log(ke
®¡12
®¡1)g + ®
¤
: (6.12)
13Since ® > 1, the ¯rst factor above is positive.
(i) It is easy to see that if ± > 2ek
1
®¡1, then the term within f g in the numerator is also
positive. Hence in this case, a¤ is an increasing function of ±.
(ii) The term within [ ] in (6.12) may be written as ®f1(±) ¡ f2(±):
First assume that 2e
k < ± · ±0. Note that from Lemma 8 (ii), f2(±) > 0 since 2e
k < ±.
Since ± < ±0, again from Lemma 8 (i), f1(±) · 0. Hence ®f1(±) ¡ f2(±) < 0 and (ii) follows
in this case.
Now suppose ± > ±0. Note that
± · 2k
1
®¡1 ) log± · log2 +
1
® ¡ 1
logk (6.13)
) ® ¡ 1 ·
logk
log± ¡ log2
: (6.14)
Further, since ® > 1 + 1
2±¡1, we have 1
®¡1 < 2± ¡ 1. Hence
± · 2k
1
®¡1 ) ± · 2k
2±¡1 ) (1 ¡ 2±)logk + log± ¡ log2 < 0:
Using these,
®f1(±) ¡ f2(±) = ®f1(±) ¡ [¡1 + 2± logk + f1(±)] (6.15)
= (® ¡ 1)[1 + 2±(log± ¡ 1 ¡ log2)] + 1 ¡ 2± logk (6.16)
·
logk
log± ¡ log2
[1 + 2±(log± ¡ 1 ¡ log2)] + 1 ¡ 2± logk (6.17)
=
logk [1 + 2±(log± ¡ 1 ¡ log2)] + (log± ¡ log2)(1 ¡ 2± logk)
log± ¡ log2
(6.18)
=
(1 ¡ 2±)logk + log± ¡ log2
log± ¡ log2
< 0: (6.19)
This proves (ii). ¥
6.3 Arguments for Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall from (3.1) that
p
¤ =
µ
2
±
¶ 1
2±(®¡1)¡®
(k)
2±¡1
2±(®¡1)¡® = k
1
®¡1
·
2
±
k
1
®¡1
¸ 1
2±(®¡1)¡®
: (6.20)
Hence to study the behavior of p¤ as ± varies, it is enough to study K = K(±) given by
K =
1
2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®
h
log(2k
1
®¡1) ¡ log±
i
:
14Note that
@K
@±
=
[log2k
1
®¡1 ¡ log±](¡2(® ¡ 1))
(2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®)2 +
1
2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®
(¡
1
±
) (6.21)
=
¡1
(2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®)
"
1
±
+
2(® ¡ 1)[log(2k
1
®¡1) ¡ log±]
(2±(® ¡ 1) ¡ ®)
#
(6.22)
=
¡1
2(® ¡ 1)
³ 1
± ¡ ®
2(®¡1)
´
"
1
±
+
log(2k
1
®¡1) ¡ log±
± ¡ ®
2(®¡1)
#
(6.23)
=
¡1
2±(® ¡ 1)
³ 1
± ¡ ®
2(®¡1)
´2 ·
±
³
1 + log(2k
1
®¡1) ¡ log±
´
¡
®
2(® ¡ 1)
¸
(6.24)
=
¡1
2±(® ¡ 1)
³ 1
± ¡ ®
2(®¡1)
´2
"
± log
¡2ek
1
®¡1
±
¢
¡
®
2(® ¡ 1)
#
: (6.25)
The result now follows easily from (6.25). We omit the algebraic details. ¥
6.4 Properties of the functions ¡ and H
De¯ne the well known digamma function D(¢) and a related function H(¢) as
D(p) = log¡(p); H(p) = log¡(p +
1
2
) ¡ log¡(p) = D(p +
1
2
) ¡ D(p):
See Abramowitz and Stegun (1972, pp. 258-259) for some of the properties of D(¢) that we
state and use below. The function H(¢) will play an important role in our analysis. For
instance, we can rewrite b a as
b a =
Ãp
µ
±
! 2
2±¡1
e
2
2±¡1H(p):
Lemma 9 (i) For all p > 0,
1 < 2pH
0(p) < 2: (6.26)
(ii) For all p > 0,
H
00(p) > ¡
1
p2: (6.27)
(iii) As p ! 1,
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
¼ p
1=2: (6.28)
(iv) As p ! 0,
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
¼
p
¼p: (6.29)
15(v) As a consequence of (iii) and (iv),
lim
p!0
H(p)
logp
= 1; lim
p!1
2H(p)
logp
= 1: (6.30)
(vi) For all 0 < p0 · 1 · p1 < 1,
p
¼
2
p0 ·
¡(p0 + 1=2)
¡(p0)
·
p
¼
2
p
1=2
0 ·
p
¼
2
p
1=2
1 ·
¡(p1 + 1=2)
¡(p1)
·
p
¼
2
p1: (6.31)
Proof of Lemma 9. We use the following known facts for digamma functions. For every
p > 0,
D
0(p) =
Z 1
0
·
e¡t
t
¡
e¡pt
1 ¡ e¡t
¸
dt: (6.32)
D
00(p) =
1 X
n=0
1
(p + n)2 > 0: (6.33)
(i) From (6.32), it follows that
H
0(p) = D
0(p +
1
2
) ¡ D
0(p) (6.34)
=
Z 1
0
"
e¡pt ¡ e¡(p+ 1
2)t
1 ¡ e¡t
#
dt (6.35)
=
Z 1
0
e
¡pt
"
1 ¡ e¡ t
2t
1 ¡ e¡t
#
dt (6.36)
=
Z 1
0
e
¡pt
·
1
1 + e¡ t
2
¸
dt: (6.37)
Hence (i) follows by observing that for all t > 0,
1
2
·
1
1 + e¡ t
2
· 1 and
Z 1
0
e
¡ptdt =
1
p
:
(ii) To prove (ii), using (6.33),
H
00(p) = D
00(p +
1
2
) ¡ D
00(p) < 0
=
1 X
n=0
·
1
(p + 1
2 + n)2 ¡
1
(p + n)2
¸
= ¡
1
p2 +
1 X
n=0
·
1
(p + 1
2 + n)2 ¡
1
(p + n + 1)2
¸
> ¡
1
p2:
(iii)-(v) Once (iii) and (iv) are proved, (v) follows trivially. To prove (iii) and (iv), by using
Stirling's approximation, ¡(x + 1) ¼
p
(2¼)e¡xxx+ 1
2, as x ! 1, it is immediately veri¯ed
that as p ! 1,
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
¼ e
1=2 (p ¡ 1
2)p
(p ¡ 1)p¡ 1
2
¼ p
1=2:
16To prove (iv) note that ¡(x) is a continuous function of x. Further, ¡(1) = 1 and ¡
¡
1
2
¢
=
p
¼.
Hence, as p ! 0, Part (v) follows immediately from this.
(vi) Using part (i), Z 1
p0
1
2p
dp ·
Z 1
p0
H
0(p)dp ·
Z 1
p0
1
p
dp
) H(1) + logp0 · H(p0) · H(1) + 1
2 logp0 ) p0eH(1) · eH(p0) · p
1=2
0 eH(1): Note that
e
H(1) =
¡(3=2)
¡(1)
=
p
¼
2
:
This proves the ¯rst two inequalities of 6.31. The proof of the other three inequalities is
similar and is omitted. ¥
6.5 Arguments for Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Taking a derivative, the ¯rst order condition for this maximization
is
(U
A (a))
0 = 2
p
µ
Ã
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
!
1
2
p
a
¡ ±a
±¡1 = 0:
This implies
b a =
"p
µ
±
Ã
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
!# 2
2±¡1
: (6.38)
Since UA(a) ! ¡1, as a ! 1 and UA(a) ! 0 as a ! 0, the above indeed yields the global
maximum.
(ii) It then follows using (6.38) that
U
A(b a) = 2
p
µ
³
b a
1
2
´ ¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
¡ b a
±
= (2± ¡ 1)b a
± > 0:
(iii) It is easily checked that
@ logb a
@p
=
2
2± ¡ 1
H
0(p) > 0:
(iv) The employer will choose µ and p to maximize her expected payo®, given by
L =
Z 1
0
[(1 ¡ µ)x]f (xjb a)dx ¡
p®
®k
(6.39)
= (1 ¡ µ)b ap ¡
p®
®k
: (6.40)
17Note that
@L
@µ
= ¡b ap + (1 ¡ µ)pb a
1
(2± ¡ 1)µ
= b ap[¡1 +
1
2± ¡ 1
(
1
µ
¡ 1)]:
Hence,
@L
@µ
= 0 )
1
2± ¡ 1
µ
1
µ
¡ 1
¶
= 1 ) µ
¤ =
1
2±
:
Further,
@2L
@µ2 =
b ap
(2± ¡ 1)µ
[¡1 +
1
2± ¡ 1
(
1
µ
¡ 1)] + b ap[¡
1
(2± ¡ 1)µ2]
=
b ap
(2± ¡ 1)µ
·
¡1 ¡
1
2± ¡ 1
¸
< 0:
Hence µ¤ = 1
2± is the global maximum. ¥
6.6 Arguments for Lemma 5
Taking logarithm on both sides of (4.8), p¤ is a solution of the equation
h(p) = 0 where (6.41)
h(p) = (® ¡ 1)logp ¡ logk ¡ logb a ¡ log
·
1 +
2p
2± ¡ 1
H
0(p)
¸
(6.42)
= (® ¡ 1)logp ¡ logk ¡ logg(p;±) (say): (6.43)
The nature of this function h(¢) as a function of p is crucial to the proof of Lemma 5. This
is established in the following lemma. Note that
h
0(p) =
(® ¡ 1)
p
¡
@
@p
logg(p;±)
=
(® ¡ 1)
p
¡
·
2
2± ¡ 1
H
0(p) +
2[H0(p) + pH00(p)]
2± ¡ 1 + 2pH0(p)
¸
:
Lemma 10 (i) If ® > 1 + 8±
4±2¡1, then h0(p) > 0.
(ii) If ® > 1 + 2
2±¡1, then h(p) ! ¡1 as p ! 0.
(iii) If ® > 1 + 1
2±¡1, then h(p) ! 1 as p ! 1.
Proof of Lemma 10. (i) Note that h0(p) > 0 if and only if
2pH
0(p)[(2± ¡ 1)(3 ¡ ®) + 2pH
0(p)] < (® ¡ 1)(2± ¡ 1)
2
18But since pH0(p) · 1, a su±cient condition for the above to hold is
2pH
0(p)[(2± ¡ 1)(3 ¡ ®) + 2] < (® ¡ 1)(2± ¡ 1)
2:
Note that if (2± ¡ 1)(3 ¡ ®) + 2 < 0, that is if ® > 3 + 2
2±¡1, the above holds trivially.
On the other hand, if (2± ¡ 1)(3 ¡ ®) + 2 > 0, then we need
2[(2± ¡ 1)(3 ¡ ®) + 2] < (® ¡ 1)(2± ¡ 1) + (2± ¡ 1)
2
, ®[(2± ¡ 1)
2 + 2(2± ¡ 1)] > 4 + 6(2± ¡ 1) + (2± ¡ 1)
2
, ®(4±
2 ¡ 1) > 4±
2 + 8± ¡ 1 , ® > 1 +
8±
4±2 ¡ 1
:
Thus we have shown that h0(p) > 0 if either (i) ® > 3 + 2
2±¡1 or 1 + 8±
4±2¡1 < ® < 3 + 2
2±¡1:
Since 1 + 8±
4±2¡1 < 3 + 2
2±¡1, we have h0(p) > 0 if ® > 1 + 8±
4±2¡1, establishing (i).
(ii)
h(p) = (® ¡ 1)logp ¡ logk ¡ [log2 + log(2± ¡ 1) ¡ log± + logb a] + log(1 +
2p
2± ¡ 1
H(p):
First let p ! 0. Then log(1 +
2p
2±¡1H(p)) is bounded. Also using (6.30),
logb a = c +
2
2± ¡ 1
log
Ã
¡
¡
p + 1
2
¢
¡(p)
!
¼
2
2± ¡ 1
logp:
So, as p ! 0,
h(p) ¼ (® ¡ 1)logp ¡
2
2± ¡ 1
logp
which tends to ¡1 if ® is greater than 1 + 2
2±¡1: This proves (ii).
(iii) Similarly, as p ! 1,
h(p) ¼ (® ¡ 1)logp ¡
2
2± ¡ 1
H(p) ¼ [(® ¡ 1) ¡
1
2± ¡ 1
]logp
which tends to 1 when ® is greater than 1 + 1
2±¡1, proving (iii). ¥
Proof of Lemma 5. If ® > 1 + 8±
(4±2¡1), then from Lemma 10, (i) h(p) ! 1 as p ! 1,
(ii) h(p) ! ¡1 as p ! 0 and (iii) h0(p) > 0 for all p > 0. Hence there exists a unique
solution for h(p) = 0.
We now show that this solution provides the global maximum. Recall that
L = (1 ¡ µ)b ap ¡
p®
®k
:
Hence using the approximation given in Lemma 9, as p ! 0, it is easy to see that L ! 0.
19On the other hand, using again the approximations given in Lemma 9, as p ! 1, since,
if ® > 2±
2±¡1,
L ¼ c1p:p
1
2( 2
2±¡1) ¡ c2p
® ¼ c1p
2±
2±¡1 ¡ c2p
® ! ¡1:
This shows that the interior solution of h(p) = 0 indeed provides the global maximum.
Now we show that the value of L at the optimum is positive. Recall that at the interior
optimum
p®
k
= (1 ¡ µ)b ap[1 +
2p
2± ¡ 1
H
0(p)]:
Hence
L = (1 ¡ µ)b ap ¡
p®
®k
=
p®
k(1 +
2p
2±¡1H0(p))
¡
p®
®k
=
p®
®k(1 +
2p
2±¡1H0(p))
·
® ¡ (1 +
2p
2± ¡ 1
H
0(p))
¸
:
Now, recalling that 1
2 · pH0(p) · 1, we get
® ¡ 1 ¡
2p
2± ¡ 1
H
0(p) ¸ ® ¡ 1 ¡
2
2± ¡ 1
> 0:
¥
6.7 Arguments for Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6. Using (4.9), observe that the numerator of C1 equals
®(2± ¡ 1)(2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p)) ¡ (2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p))
2 ¡ 2p(2± ¡ 1)(H
0(p) + pH
00(p)): (6.44)
Since 1
2 · pH0(p) · 1, and ¡p2H00(p) > 1, we get from (6.44),
C1 > ®(2± ¡ 1)(2± ¡ 1 + 1) ¡ (2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p))
2 ¡ 2(2± ¡ 1) ¡ 2p
2(2± ¡ 1)H
00(p)
> ®(2± ¡ 1)2± ¡ (2± + 1)
2 ¡ 2(2± ¡ 1)
= ®(2± ¡ 1)2± ¡ (4±
2 + 8± ¡ 1)
> 0 if ® > 1 +
10± ¡ 1
2±(2± ¡ 1)
:
This proves the Lemma. ¥
6.8 Arguments for Lemma 7
The following Lemma provides a bound for ^ a in terms of k. It is used crucially in the proof
of Lemma 7.
20Lemma 11 p¤ satis¯es
kb a · p
®¡1 · kb a(1 +
1
2±
) (6.45)
·
5
4
kb a for all ± ¸ 2: (6.46)
Proof of Lemma 11. Recall that from Lemma 9 of Section 6.4, pH0(p) · 1. Hence,
p
®¡1 = k
b a
2±
[2± ¡ 1 + 2pH
0(p)] (6.47)
· k
b a
2±
[2± ¡ 1 + 2] (6.48)
· kb a[1 +
1
2±
] (6.49)
· kb a[1 +
1
4
] since ± ¸ 2: (6.50)
The left side follows similarly by using 2pH0(p) ¸ 1. ¥
De¯ne
A(±) =
2log2
(2± ¡ 1)2 ¡
1
±
¡
3
±(2± ¡ 1)
+
6
(2± ¡ 1)2 log±:
B1(±) = A(±) +
1
±
; B2(±) = A(±) +
2
2± + 1
; k
¤ =
p
¼
23=2±3=2k
2±¡1
2 :
It can be checked that
e
(2±¡1)2
4 B1(±) =
p
2±
3=2e
3
4±¡ 3
2:
Lemma 7 follows from the following stronger result. We omit the algebraic details of that
but prove the following result completely.
Lemma 12 Suppose ± > 1=2 and ® > 1 + 8±
4±2¡1.
(i) If ± · ¼
1
3
2 k
(2±¡1)
3 then p¤ ¸ (k¤)
2
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡1 = K¤
1 ¸ 1.
Further,
(a) if
p
¼
2 K¤
1
1=2 >
p
2±3=2e
3
4±¡ 3
2, then C2 < 0. In particular, if ± · ¼
1
3
2 k
1
3(®¡1) < ¼
1
3
2 k
2±¡1
3
then the above condition holds.
(b) if ± · ¼
1
3
2 k
1
3(®¡1) then a¤ ¸ 1.
(ii) If ± ¸ ¼
1
3
2
¡¡
1 + 1
2±
¢
k
¢ (2±¡1)
3 then p¤ ·
·³
1 + 1
2±)
´2±¡1
2
(k¤)
¸ 2
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡1
= K¤
2 · 1:
Further,
(a) if
p
¼
2 (K¤
2)1=2 <
p
2±3=2e
3
4±¡ 3
2e
¡(2±¡1)2
8±(2±+1) , then C2 > 0. In particular, if ± ¸
(¼e4)
1
3
2
¡¡
1 + 1
2±
¢
k
¢ 1
3(®¡1)
then the above condition holds.
(b) if ± ¸ ¼
1
3
2 maxf
¡¡
1 + 1
2±
¢
k
¢ (2±¡1)
3 ;
¡¡
1 + 1
2±
¢
k
¢ 1
3(®¡1)g then a¤ · 1.
21Proof of Lemma 12. First note that
C2 = A(±) ¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p) +
2
2± ¡ 1 + 2pH0(p)
:
From Lemma 9 of Section 6.4, 2pH0(p) > 1. Using this,
C2 ·A(±) ¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p) +
2
2± ¡ 1 + 1
(6.51)
·[A(±) +
1
±
] ¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p) (6.52)
=B1(±) ¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p):
Hence C2 < 0 if B1(±) ¡ 4
(2±¡1)2H(p) < 0. Or, in other words,
C2 < 0 if e
H(p) =
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
> e
(2±¡1)2
4 B1(±): (6.53)
Similarly, using the other part of Lemma 9 (i) which says that pH0(p) · 1,
C2 ¸ B2(±) ¡
4
(2± ¡ 1)2H(p):
Hence
C2 > 0 if e
H(p) =
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
< e
(2±¡1)2
4 B2(±): (6.54)
(i) First suppose, if possible p¤ = p < 1. To ease notation we write p for p¤. Using Lemma
9 (vi) for p · 1, and noting that k¤ ¸ 1,
k^ a ·p
®¡1 (6.55)
)k
·
1
21=2±3=2
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
¸ 2
2±¡1
· p
®¡1 (6.56)
)k
2±¡1
2 1
21=2±3=2
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
· p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)
2 (6.57)
)k
2±¡1
2 1
21=2±3=2
p
¼
2
p · p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)
2 (6.58)
)k
¤ · p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡2
2 · 1 (6.59)
which is a contradiction. Hence p¤ > 1. Now since p > 1, again using k^ a · p®¡1 and using
Lemma 9 (vi) for p > 1,
k
·
1
2
p
¼p1=2
21=2±3=2
¸ 2
2±¡1
· p
®¡1 (6.60)
)1 · k
¤ · p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡1
2 :
22This proves the ¯rst part of (i).
To prove the ¯rst part of (i) (a), using the given condition on k¤, and using Lemma 9
part (vi), since 1 · K¤
1 · p,
e
(2±¡1)2
4 B1(±) <
p
¼
2
(K
¤
1)
1=2 ·
¡(K¤
1 + 1=2)
¡(K¤
1)
·
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
:
Hence recalling (6.53), we conclude that C2 < 0.
We now show the second part of (i) (a). First note that
±(2±)
1=2 > e
(2±¡1)2
4 B1(±) (6.61)
, ±(2±)
1=2 >
p
2±
3=2e
3
4±¡ 3
2 (6.62)
, 1 > e
3
4±¡ 3
2 (6.63)
,
3
4±
¡
3
2
< 0 (6.64)
which holds if ± > 1=2. Hence it is enough to show that
p
¼
2 (K¤
1)1=2 > ±(2±)1=2. This upon
simpli¯cation yields
± ·
¼
1
3
2
k
1
3(®¡1)
proving (i) (a) completely.
To prove (i) (b) note that since p¤ ¸ 1, by Lemma 9 (i)
(a
¤)
2±¡1
2 =
p
µ
±
¡(p¤ + 1=2)
¡(p¤)
¸
p
µ
±
¡(K¤
1 + 1=2)
¡(K¤
1)
¸
p
µ
±
p
¼
2
(K
¤
1)
1=2:
Hence a¤ ¸ 1 if ¼
4K¤
1 > 2±3: Simpli¯cation yields ± · ¼
1
3
2 k
1
3(®¡1). This proves (i) (b).
(ii) The proof of (ii) is similar. First suppose, if possible p¤ = p > 1. De¯ne ^ ± = 1 + 1
2±.
Using Lemma 9 (vi) for p > 1,
p
®¡1 ·^ ±k^ a (6.65)
)p
®¡1 · ^ ±k
·
1
21=2±3=2
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
¸ 2
2±¡1
(6.66)
)p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)
2 ·
³
^ ±k
´2±¡1
2 1
21=2±3=2
p
¼p
2
(6.67)
)
³
^ ±k
´ 2±¡1
2
p
¼
2
1
21=2±3=2 ¸ p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)
2 ¡1 (6.68)
)
³
^ ±
´2±¡1
2
k
¤ ¸ p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡2
2 ¸ 1 (6.69)
23which is a contradiction. Hence p¤ · 1.
Now again using p®¡1 · ^ ±k^ a and Lemma 9 (vi) for p · 1,
p
®¡1 ·^ ±k
·
1
21=2±3=2
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
¸ 2
2±¡1
(6.70)
)p
®¡1 · ^ ±k
·
1
2
p
¼p1=2
21=2±3=2
¸ 2
2±¡1
(6.71)
)p
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡1
2 ·
h
^ ±k
i 2±¡1
2
p
¼
23=2±3=2 (6.72)
)p ·
·³
^ ±k
´ 2±¡1
2
p
¼
23=2±3=2
¸ 2
(®¡1)(2±¡1)¡1
= K
¤
2
This proves the ¯rst part of (ii).
To prove the ¯rst part of (ii) (a), using the given condition on k¤, and using Lemma 9
part (vi), since p · K¤
2 · 1,
¡(p + 1=2)
¡(p)
·
¡(K¤
2 + 1=2)
¡(K¤
2)
·
p
¼
2
(K
¤
2)
1=2 · e
(2±¡1)2
4 B2(±):
Hence recalling (6.54), we conclude that C2 > 0.
The proofs of second part of (ii) (a) and of (ii) (b) are similar to the proofs of second
part of (i) (a) and (i) (b). We omit the details. ¥
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25Figure 1: Plot of the four curves in Lemma 2 when ® = 4 (i) K(±) =
µ
±
2e
¶®¡1
(red), (ii) K(±) =
2e
±
(green), (iii) K(±) =
µ
±
2
¶®¡1
(blue) and (iv) K(±) = e
®¡1
® (black). Part (i) of Lemma 2 holds in
the region below the red curve and part (ii) of the Lemma holds in the region between the green
and the blue curves, above the black curve.
26Figure 2: Plot of the two curves in Lemma 3 when ® = 1:5. (i) K(±) =
µ
±
2
¶®¡1
(red) and (ii)
K(±) = e
®
2±
µ
±
2e
¶®¡1
(green). Part (i) of the Lemma holds in the region above the red curve and
part (ii) of the Lemma holds in the region below the green curve.
27Figure 3: Plot of the two curves in Lemma 3 when ® = 4. (i) K(±) =
µ
±
2
¶®¡1
(red) and (ii)
K(±) = e
®
2±
µ
±
2e
¶®¡1
(green). Part (i) of the Lemma holds in the region above the red curve and
part (ii) of the Lemma holds in the region below the green curve.
28Figure 4: Plot of the three curves in Lemma 7 when ® = 1:2. (i) K(±) =
(2±)
3
2±¡1
¼
1
2±¡1
(red), (ii)
K(±) =
2±
2± + 1
(
(2±)
3
2±¡1
(¼e4)
1
2±¡1
)
(green) and (iii) K(±) =
2±
2± + 1
(
(2±)3(®¡1)
(¼e4)(®¡1)
)
(blue). Part (i) of
Lemma holds in the region above the red curve. Part (ii) holds in the region in common region
below the green and the blue curves.
29Figure 5: Plot of the three curves in Lemma 7 when ® = 2:1. (i) K(±) =
(2±)
3
2±¡1
¼
1
2±¡1
(red), (ii)
K(±) =
2±
2± + 1
(
(2±)
3
2±¡1
(¼e4)
1
2±¡1
)
(green) and (iii) K(±) =
2±
2± + 1
(
(2±)3(®¡1)
(¼e4)(®¡1)
)
(blue). Part (i) of
Lemma holds in the region above the red curve. Part (ii) holds in the region in common region
below the green and the blue curves.
30